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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper criticizes McChesney's (1990) hypothesis that the decisions to initially and 
subsequently terminate American Indian allotment were based on the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 
(BIA) interest to inflate their budget.  By adopting a richer database on the BIA appropriations 
from 1877-1945 and correcting for model specification problems, I find no empirical evidence 
supporting any of McChesney's hypotheses concerning the bureaucratic demand for regulatory 
change.  In fact, other large budgetary items, such as New Deal relief funding, Court of Claims 
judgments, and educational spending, crowded out BIA land management appropriations over 
these years.  Interestingly, a cursory overview of this period illustrates how the BIA fought for 
less, rather than more, administrative control over Indian affairs.      
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
he economics literature concerning the privatization of American Indian lands from 1887-1934 is 
extremely scarce. This is in stark contrast to the voluminous and detailed narratives written by 
historians on the allotment and assimilation era (see, for example, Hoxie (1984), Otis (1973), and 
Prucha (1986)). To date, McChesney (1990) is the only paper to use economic theory, albeit informal, and empirical 
evidence to explain the government's decision to first adopt and then halt Indian allotment.
1
  McChesney (1990) 
specifically shows that both pieces of legislation were "complementary parts of an overall political policy that 
increased bureaucratic budgets while simultaneously serving the aims of well-organized non-Indian interest groups" 
(299). This paper criticizes McChesney's bureaucratic aggrandizement hypothesis by adopting a richer database on 
historical BIA appropriations and augmenting McChesney's model specifications albeit slightly. Surprisingly, I find 
no evidence -- empirical or descriptive -- that the desire or ability to augment the bureau's budget drove Indian 
policy.     
 
This period in Indian land regulation is important for several reasons. First, while private property rights 
align private rewards with social benefits, the American Indian experience hardly corroborates with this fundamental 
economic paradigm. For example, the prima facie evidence of the destructive consequences of allotment on 
reservations includes the reduction of the Indian land base by roughly 90 million acres from 1887-1934, a decrease 
in per capita Indian income to roughly one-tenth the US average by 1934, and the impetus of such land ownership 
problems as checkboarding and fractionalization which still impede optimal land use today.
2
 Second, the perceived 
failure with privatization propagated the trope that Indian policy recommendations need to provide measures of 
federal protection against private ownership (Trosper, 1978). Last, prohibiting future allotment and extending the 
trust period indefinitely over Indian lands intensified federal regulation over Indian affairs that has persisted until the 
slow transition toward Indian self-determination starting in the 1970s.  
                                                          
1 Carlson (1981, 1983) also discusses inter alia the economic reasons for the decline in the relative and absolute level of Indian 
farming and the positive association between allotting land and farm parity prices. However, an explanation for the passage and, 
more importantly, the termination of allotment is not undertaken. 
2 Most historians adopt John Collier's claim in 1934 that 96 million acres had been removed from Indian reservations.  However, 
the exact amount of land loss is still somewhat unclear.  For example, Collier's estimate of 48 million acres in 1934 under Indian 
control does not collaborate with a study by the National Resources Board in the same year that calculated the Indian land base at 
51.9 million acres. 
T 
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The general models of regulation are comprised either of market-correcting, public interest or rent-seeking, 
interest group theories (see, for example, Stigler's (1971) seminal work on capturing rents through regulation). In 
this particular case, a public interest theory for allotting in severalty hardly seems appropriate two reasons: the lack 
of evidence of a prevailing market failure and the welfare-diminishing aspects of providing trust patents to Indians 
with restraints on alienation.
3
 McChesney (1990) finds that only one group -- the BIA -- benefited from initial 
allotment, the way the government assigned land rights, and the eventual termination of allotment because, in his 
eyes, each characteristic of the allotment period necessitated greater budgetary appropriations.  This explanation fits 
neatly with Peltzman's (1976) interest group theory of regulation and a tractable empirical counterpart measuring 
bureaucratic self-interest (see Niskanen 1971).  
 
However, there are several reasons to question this conclusion.  First, Casas-Pardo and Puchades-Navarro's 
(2001) identification of the Niskanen's restrictive assumption of perfect discriminating monopoly power is germane 
to this period in American Indian history. By the 1930s, the BIA held little bargaining power on budgetary 
appropriations over the sponsor since bureaucratic X-inefficiency was a chief reason for policy reform.  Second, 
adopting aggregate BIA budget figures generates an identification problem since the effect of changing reservation 
property rights on the land management portion of the BIA's budget cannot be ferreted out.  Finally, while ex post 
bureaucratic control over tribal land grew after terminating allotment, a closer reading of the primary documents 
during the 1930s suggests that the ex ante demand to enlarge the BIA's autocratic role in Indian Affairs simply did 
not exist.   
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
While methods used by the federal government have significantly changed over time, federal Indian policy 
has been largely driven by the confluence of the ideological demand to "civilize" Indians and the non-Indian demand 
for Indian resources. Initially, the demand for eastern Indian land led the government to establish a policy to remove 
Indians west of the Mississippi River during the 1830s.
4
  Later, when US expansion continued, Indian land cessions 
during the 1850s contained provisions that established Indians reservations (Prucha, 1986: 108-121). However, 
when the government liberalized access to the public domain under the Homestead Act of 1862, Congress passed a 
similar act on Indian reservations in 1887. Amongst competing private interests, eastern religious reform 
organizations, in particular the religious leaders that attended the influential Lake Mohonk Conferences, were highly 
influential in pressuring the government to privatize Indian lands.
5
  Their non-pecuniary benefits from advocating 
privatization aligned, at least initially, with the demand for Indian land by western settlers and railroad companies.  
 
The General Allotment Act of February 8, 1887 or simply the Dawes Act, named after its chief sponsor 
Senator Henry Dawes, divided reservations into 160-acre parcels for families, 80-acre plots for single men over 
eighteen, and 40-acre plots to single persons under eighteen (Carlson 1981). An Indian was granted four years after 
allotment to choose a surveyed plot or the government would provide the assignment for him. The remaining land, 
termed "surplus" land, was opened for sale and the proceeds were escrowed in the tribe's trust accounts held in the 
US Treasury. The legal title to allotted land was initially held in trust with the government for a 25-year period in 
which the land could not be alienated or taxed. In many ways, as Ambler (1990, 10) describes, "Indians received 
their `homesteads' generally from communally owned tribal lands; non-Indians received theirs from communally 
owned public lands." 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Anderson (1992) provides numerous examples of usufruct property systems among indigenous tribes. Wishart (1996) also 
estimates that farm self-sufficiency levels among the Cherokees prior to removal were equivalent to their white neighbors. The 
Cherokees had long held private rights over land improvements -- such as structures, fences and crops -- but not to the land itself.  
4 See Foreman (1932) for a descriptive account of Indian removal specifically pertaining to southeastern tribes. 
5 Senator Dawes told the Lake Mohonk Conference in 1887, "It should be called the Mohonk bill... you are responsible for it" 
(qtd. in Otis, 1971: 36). Held in upstate New York, politicians like Sen. Dawes, bureaucrats like the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, and assimilation/religious leaders (e.g., Boston Indian Citizenship Committee, the Indian Rights Association, 
and the Women's National Indian Association) meet annually from 1883 to 1916 for the weekend to evaluate federal Indian 
policy. Debates and reports on Indian progress typically dominated the conference (Hoxie, 1984: 12).  
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Prior to 1903, the government needed tribal consent to allot and sell "surplus" lands on each reservation, 
which consequentially delayed the opening of land for non-Indians. However, tribal sovereignty was compromised 
after the passage of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock in 1903 when the Supreme Court allowed Congress to exercise plenary 
authority over Indian allotment (Clark 1994).
6
  After 1903, Congress could abrogate prior treaty stipulations and 
allot reservations without the consent of Indian tribes. Not surprisingly, from 1904-1920, over 15 million acres were 
allotted whereas roughly 6 million acres were allotted prior to 1904 (Indian Affairs Reports, 1888-1920).  
 
Arguably, the most devastating aspects of allotment acts involved two modifications to the original act. 
Going against the stated objectives of the Dawes Act, Congress in 1891 overturned a long-standing policy by 
allowing negotiations for ten-year agricultural and five-year mineral lease contracts (Prucha, 2000: 182-184).
7
 
Congressional powers over mineral leasing consequentially expanded in 1909 with the passage of the Indian 
Appropriations Act, which allowed for allotted land to be "leased for mining purposes for any term of years as may 
be deemed advisable by the Secretary of the Interior" (Mills and Willingham, 1926: 534). Second, the Burke Act of 
1906 liberalized the issuance of fee patents by removing the 25-year trust period to any Indian declared "competent 
and capable" (Prucha, 2000: 205-206). Indians containing one-half or less Indian blood were immediately issued fee 
patents and became US citizens. During the peak of trust-to-fee conversion from 1917-1919, many Indians were 
forced to receive their titles or were not informed of the removal of federal trust restrictions (Ambler 1990: 14-15). 
Ironically, Indian Commissioner Francis Leupp in 1908 suggested that lifting restrictions on alienation -- which 
under standard economic theory would be welfare improving -- should be used as a form of punishment for breaking 
state laws (Hoxie 1984: 166-167). 
 
After 1920 the general support of allotment by western economic interests and eastern humanitarian groups 
fell. A deep drop in oil prices caused by overproduction halted oil leasing on Indian lands in 1932. A general 
downturn in land prices after 1920 also abated the demand for Indian land. A number of humanitarian organizations 
eventually pledged solidarity to the "Meriam Report," an influential study conducted by the Institute for 
Government Research (modern-day Brookings Institution) that recommended inter alia ending allotment and halting 
the bureaucratic oversight in Indian resource management. After 1920 the Secretary of the Interior directed that no 
Indian should be given a fee patent without thorough investigation. When John Collier, founder of the pro-Indian 
rights American Indian Defense Association, became Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1933, his desire to 
consolidate various federal Indian policy reforms into one bill eventually led to the passage of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) on June 18, 1934 that officially ended the policy of allotment (Koppes, 1977).  
 
Besides ending allotment, the IRA extended the trust period indefinitely and authorized an annual 
appropriation of $2 million to increase the size of reservations for landless Indians. Existing "surplus" land was 
removed from potential sale and returned to the tribe. To stimulate economic recovery, the act established a $10 
million revolving credit fund available to tribes that established business charters. The IRA also contained a loan 
program to assist Indian students attending vocational schools. The federal government altered the institutional 
arrangement of Indian-white relations by guaranteeing the powers of tribal self-government as long as the tribe 
voted to accept a boilerplate constitution designed by the federal government (Philp 1983). Eventually, 175 tribes 
accepted the terms of the IRA, whereas 78 reservations including the most-populace tribe, the Navajo, rejected its 
terms (Reinhardt, 2005).  
 
Given this brief history of the allotment period, McChesney's (1990) results can be discussed in a better 
light. Along with eastern religious and western economic interests, McChesney (1990) also claims that Congress and 
the BIA, with their supposed aligned incentives, jointly benefited from initial allotment:  "Larger budgets [required 
from administering privatization] benefited politicians as well since they went for enlargement of the bureaucracy, 
creating patronage positions of value to politicians" (318). McChesney then explains how restrictions on alienation, 
                                                          
6 The decision was the culmination of government effects to suppress cultural expression on reservations. For example, the Curtis 
Act of 1898 disbanded tribal courts and stripped tribal governments of its discretionary powers (Amber, 1990). 
7 Prior to 1891, there were no statutes concerning Indian tribal leasing. The Attorney General in 1885 declared all forms of 
leasing illegal on Indian trust lands. However, in 1891 (26 Stat. 795), allowed mineral and agricultural leasing if an Indian was 
unable to use the resources "by reason of age or other disability" (FTC, 1975: 11). For an extensive discussion on the history of 
leasing, in particular with respect to oil and gas, on Indian lands, see McLane (1955). 
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which were adverse to the interests of non-Indian economic interests, "necessarily increased the amount of work [by 
the BIA], and hence the budgets, needed to implement the statute" (325). However, these inflated budgets could not 
persist in the long run, as Congress would become unwilling to appropriate money when interest in allotment 
declined after 1920. Furthermore, the bureaucratic interest in allotment was expected to decline since the loss of 
Indian population under the BIA's jurisdiction, caused by issuing fee patents, "diminished the BIA's control over 
resources" (318).  He then adopted the "Meriam" Report's recommendation of "doubling the current appropriations 
levels" as supportive anecdotal evidence of his budget maximization hypotheses.  Therefore, the IRA served, in 
McChesney's eyes, as a panacea to declining budgets: "Ending allotments and freezing ownership for allotees still 
under federal trusteeship guaranteed that bureaucratic control would continue" (325).  
 
The chief contribution of McChesney's approach, in my eyes, is its emphasis on the compromises inherent 
in the various pieces of allotment legislation. After all, while the pure privatization of Indian lands -- a corner 
solution in a regulator's utility maximization problem -- was in the best interest of non-Indian economic interests, the 
government placed restraints on alienation and encouraged leasing rather than full-scaled land cessions. This implies 
that the marginal rate of substitution (of Indian (consumer) surplus for non-Indian (producer) surplus) was strictly 
positive - i.e., the sponsor placed a positive value on Indian welfare changes. Given these historical events, 
McChesney develops two testable hypotheses that correspond to his descriptive model: (1.) the passage of the 
Dawes Act and the IRA should have increased the BIA budget; and (2.) allotments and acreage allotted should have 
increased the BIA budget but at a decreasing rate. Both hypotheses suggest that allotment had short-run benefits and 
long-run consequences on the BIA’s budget, implying extending the trust period indefinitely ensured bureaucratic 
power or prestige, both considered correlated with budgets (Niskanen, 1971).  
 
Prior to my empirical reinvestigation, several points of these hypotheses and the adoption of Niskanen's 
budget maximization model warrant discussion. First, a cursory overview of primary sources written during the 
1930s provides no evidence of this supposed ex ante strategy of the BIA to augment Indian private property rights to 
maximize budgets. For example, John Collier's original draft of the IRA bill required all allotted land to be 
transferred back to tribal ownership. Ending allotment and turning land management to tribal control was designed 
to decrease -- and not increase as McChesney claims -- the need for future bureaucratic oversight. In fact, one of the 
chief recommendations in the "Meriam Report" was "to transfer the administration [of land management issues such 
as consolidation, heirship problems, and the leasing/selling of lands] to the Indian communities themselves" (U.S. 
Hearing, 1934: 22). The departmental appropriation increases suggested in the "Meriam Report," which are 
emphasized by McChesney, were concerned with shifting the nature of Indian education from boarding to day 
schooling.  Thus, the recommendation to expand the budget had nothing in common with changing its land policy. 
 
The eventual enactment that terminated future allotment made land transfers to tribal governments 
voluntary -- thereby nullifying Collier's objective -- which coincidentally continued the bureaucratic oversight of 
fractioned allotments. Congress, in particular the co-sponsor Senator Burton Wheeler, pushed for the retention of 
bureaucratic control in the final act rather than the bureau. Sen. Wheeler's logic was uncompromisingly paternalistic: 
"in my judgment, if you did it [i.e., turn land management over to tribal control], you would find it would be 
saturated with all kinds of corruption, and unless it is done by the Department of the Interior, Congress will never 
appropriate the money" (U.S. House Hearings, 1934: 96-97). Thus, throughout the Congressional hearings on the 
IRA bill, the bureau pushed to reduce rather than enlarge its autocratic role in land management: "If Congress finds 
that an Indian tribe can administer a service cheaper and better than the Indian Bureau is doing it, Congress is going 
to be willing to have the tribe do it (Ibid.).
8
  
 
McChesney's argument concerning ending allotment also hinges on the long run adverse consequences of 
relaxing the alienation restrictions on the BIA budget. However, the net effect of allotment on the BIA budget is 
theoretically unclear. I agree that issuing fee patents decreased the Indian land base and the BIA jurisdiction over 
Indian land management. However, the partial effect of future allotment on the Indian land base would have been 
                                                          
8 The revolving credit fund, which promulgated future bureaucratic oversight, was also added by the House Committee on Indian 
Affairs and the fund's authorized appropriations increased from an initial request of $5 to $10 million in the final act. The 
numerous augmentations of Collier's original draft discarded many of Collier's objectives. See Deloria, Jr. and Lytle (1984: 265-
270) for a comparison of the two bills. 
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small since the majority of land loss from allotment occurred from the sale of "surplus" land rather than from 
liberalizing fee patenting after the Burke Act.  By 1934, the demand for potential "surplus" lands would have been 
muted since roughly 40% of the existing land base was considered "desert lands or semi-desert, nearly or quite 
worthless" (Ibid.: 30).   
 
While land under BIA's jurisdiction was falling, the administrating cost of managing un-ceded, allotted 
land was growing. Problems with fractionalized allotments such as managing leases, selling land, or determining 
heirs only increased over time.  The intensification of fractionalization would have necessitated larger budgets to 
deal with these non-tangible land management problems. By 1934, the goals of the IRA were not simply to end 
allotment but to turn "the futile, expensive real-estate transactions [of the BIA] to a minimum" (Ibid.: 711). Thus, ex 
ante bureaucratic aggrandizement was not the reason for the growth in ex post bureaucratic control after the passage 
of the IRA.  The positive effect of fragmentation from future allotment on the BIA budget could have easily 
outweighed the negative effect of land loss from fee patenting.  In reality, freezing allotment in severalty in 1934 
may have decreased the future growth in the BIA budget.   
 
Furthermore, the general theory of regulation as illustrated by Beard et. al. (2003) suggests that standard 
assumptions of the shape of the sponsor's indifference curves eliminate corner solutions (such as pure privatization 
and absolute restraints on alienation). While McChesney emphasizes the compromises to various interest groups 
within the Dawes Act, the same compromises within the IRA are left unmentioned. Given his strong emphasis on 
the agricultural demand to own Indian land, his "corner solution" interpretation of the IRA (i.e., the interpretation 
that the IRA solely ended the future alienation of Indian property) eliminates a non-bureaucratic interest group 
explanation for its passage. While the true intents of the IRA have been mentioned, the omnibus IRA contained 
numerous compromises that suggest that private interests may have helped maintain this form of regulation over 
time.
9
    
 
For example, the IRA left open the ability for future allotment even if a tribe did not vote to accept its 
provisions. Therefore, the sponsor instituted some flexibility to increase future surpluses of non-Indian economic 
groups. Also, southwestern economic interests succeeded in eliminating the Papago Reservation and its mineral base 
from the IRA, thereby unaltering the practice of leasing Papago subsurface rights to Arizona mining companies.  
Finally, the adoption of tribal governments in the IRA, which is considered the most influential component of the 
IRA, provided a blueprint for the BIA to manage leases for coal, oil, and gas resources on Indian lands. Ambler 
(2000) finds that these tribal governments, which were all formed from a standardized constitution designed by the 
BIA, became satellite organizations of the BIA that simply "rubber-stamped" most leasing arrangements.  These 
constitutions maintained that ownership to subsurface and surface rights went to the tribe, thereby ending the 
complicated split ownership between surface and subsurface rights that existed during the allotment period. 
Standardizing leasing negotiations would have been in the best interest of mining companies since subsurface rights 
were initially given to individual allotees, which increased the cost of negotiating large-scale mineral operations.  
 
Lastly, and most importantly, the restrictive assumptions of the Niskanen's (1971) budget maximization 
model cannot be applied to the relationship between the BIA and the sponsor. In particular, if the BIA's goal was to 
maximize its budget, then the bureau must maintain perfect bargaining power over the sponsor. This assumption, 
along with the budget maximization goal, suggests that the bureau oversupplies its "output."  Yet, conventional 
wisdom over the IRA's early years suggests that the sponsor undersupplied its provisions. As Kelly (1975:305-306) 
clearly writes, "the existing literature on the Collier years... has tended to fix the blame for failure [of the IRA] on a 
narrow-minded and penny-pinching Congress."  One feasible explanation for shortchanging BIA programs is that 
the appropriations committees, especially during the 1930s, were dominated by western congressmen whose 
constituents would have borne a disproportionate amount of the costs from the BIA plans to enhance tribal 
sovereignty.  The opposition to appropriation requests only intensified when the BIA acquired a substantial transfer 
from the New Deal Resettlement Administration to acquire land for Indians (Kelly, 1975).   
                                                          
9 By 1940, a Senate bill was drafted to eliminate the provisions of the IRA on reservations focused not on reestablishing 
allotment but over the agency problems with the newly created tribal councils. An excerpt from these hearings summarizes the 
concerns of many reservations: "There is less Indian self-government now that ever has been. The attempt to set up a state within 
a state has failed. Tribes have bound themselves to the Department and councils are following the dictates of the local agencies." 
(Senate Hearing, 1940: 8-9). The bill eventually died in committee hearings.  
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 Table 1 bears out the lack of bargaining power of the BIA over the sponsor during the 1930s.
 10
 There were 
four provisions in the IRA that required discretionary approval by the House Committee on the Interior Department 
Appropriations Bill. The IRA authorized $250,000 for "defraying the expenses of organizing Indian chartered 
corporations or other organizations created under this Act," yet Congress never supplied more than $150,000 after 
1934 (qtd. in Kappler, 1941: 380). The educational loans to reimburse tuition and other expenses in vocational and 
trade schools were capped at $250,000 annually, but Congress averaged only $115,000 after 1934. The annual 
authorized appropriation of $2 million for land acquisition never exceeded $1 million during the 1930s and dropped 
for the remainder of the decade. Most importantly, appropriations to the revolving fund were substantially undercut. 
The $10 million revolving fund was only appropriated $4.8 million by 1940. The fund was eliminated during the 
war and only revived well after the war. Thus, from 1935 to 1940, while the IRA authorized a total of $25 million in 
appropriations to the BIA, Congress appropriated just 40% of this amount.  
 
 This evidence suggests that ex ante bureaucratic aggrandizement was not at the heart of private property 
reforms during the 1930s. Regardless, statistical methods are necessary to disentangle multiple influences on the 
BIA's budget and validate these anecdotal claims.  
 
 Statistical methods can provide evidence of the possible crowding out of the discretionary portions of the 
BIA budget from increases in funding outside the discretion of the House Committee on Interior Department 
Appropriations. Fortunately, the availability of historical BIA budgetary data allow for such estimation.   
 
III.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
  
The BIA budgetary data are collected from two Treasury Department sources: the State of the Finances of 
the US for the fiscal years 1877-1892, and its predecessor, the Combined Statement of Balances, Appropriations, 
and Expenditures, for the fiscal years 1893-1945.
11
  Since these documents deduct transfers and repayments to each 
appropriation type and are written at the end of each fiscal year, they are considered "at present the most 
comprehensive report[s] of the government's financial operations and the status of appropriations and funds" (Selko, 
1940: 521-522). The BIA budget is split into two components: treasury and trust appropriations. Trust accounts 
contain payments to tribes from past treaty stipulations, royalties from selling and leasing allotted lands, and interest 
on investments held by the federal government under the name of a tribe. The treasury appropriations contain 
funding for BIA salaries, education, health, irrigation, land management, Court of Claims judgments, and, during the 
1930s, New Deal relief transfers from independent offices to the BIA.  
 
The appropriation figures contained in the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (see Fig. 
1) are not adopted for four simple reasons.  First, the Annual Reports data are incomplete since the appropriations 
from 1915 to 1919 and 1941 to 1945 are missing.  The annual report data also understates both the mean and 
variance of actual BIA end-of-the-year appropriations.  Second, data in the Annual Reports are highly aggregated; 
only during the 1930s is the budget disaggregated into components such as trust, education, and irrigation accounts. 
Third, the annual report data contain measurement error. For example, the 1934 appropriations figure in the Annual 
Report refers to the BIA's allocation in the annual Interior Department Appropriations Act for that year, which 
excludes the supplementary appropriations from deficiency acts, private relief acts, and emergency relief acts. 
Fourth, and most importantly, transfers to the BIA during the New Deal, which amounted to $56 million from 1933 
to 1939, were omitted from the Annual Report figures.  The Treasury documents allow for a continuous time series 
on BIA budgets, the disaggregation of the total budget, and complete, year-end BIA appropriations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The 1936 Interior Department Appropriations Act, which contained the initial IRA appropriations, was made immediately 
available in FY 1935. The appropriations in the next year were not made immediately available, expect for the educational 
appropriations, and thus the majority of IRA appropriations contained in the 1937 Interior Department Appropriations Act were 
not placed on the government's books until 1938 (Digest of Appropriations, 1936-1938). 
11 Section 15 of the Act of July 31, 1894 required the Secretary of the Treasury to provide "an accurate statement of receipts and 
expenditures... by each separate head of appropriation" (qtd. in Payne and Banning, 1940: 44).  
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McChesney's empirical models are as follows:  
 
BUDGETt= 0 + 1 * DAWES + 2 * IRA + 3*zt +       (1) 
 
BUDGETt= 0 + 1 * Allotments t + 2 * Allotments
2
 t + 3*zt + t  (2) 
 
BUDGETt= 0 + 1 * Acreage t + 2 * Acreage
2
 t + 3*zt + t  (3) 
 
where BUDGETt is the BIA total appropriations in year t, DAWES represents 1 for 1888 on, 0 otherwise, IRA is 1 
for 1935 on, 0 otherwise, the allotment variable shows the number of allotments approved, the acreage variable is 
the number of acres allotted in a particular year, and z represents a vector of covariates including Indian population 
and general trends in U.S. economic activity.
12
   
 
There are three general econometric issues with these model specifications. First, an examination of the raw 
data in Fig. 1 reveals a potential problem with this method. Specially, nominal BIA appropriations appear non-
stationary; i.e., its mean and variance are not constant over time. This suggests that omitting a time trend (or not 
differencing the data) could lead to spurious results.  Second, eqs. (2) and (3) do not directly address McChesney's 
claim that over time allotting land would lower the budget. Interacting allotments and allotted acreage with time 
dummies will directly test this hypothesis. Third, the general increase in the BIA budget may be a function of the 
increases to the relief or educational components of their BIA budget, rather than land management budgetary items. 
These data allow for such disaggregation and thus, budgetary trends concerning the management of Indian land can 
be better isolated.    
 
IV.  RESULTS 
  
 Various regressions, modeled after Eqs. (1)-(3), are estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to 
account for first-order serial correlation and the results of these regressions are shown in Table. 2.
13
 Column 1 
presents the unconditional results of Eq. (1). The results suggest that the passage of the Dawes Act and the IRA were 
not associated with higher appropriations; in fact, the IRA dummy variable is negative and statistically significant 
once a time trend is included. In particular, the passage of the IRA was roughly associated with a 33% decrease in 
the growth rate of BIA appropriations. By adding two lagged variables for Indian population (which is unavailable 
from 1941 to 1945) and nominal GDP to this model, the results in Column 2 also suggest that neither act increased 
the growth rate in the BIA budget. The statistical significance of the IRA variable is reduced due to the high 
correlation with Indian population variable and the reduction in the sample size. Though not shown, the negative and 
significant coefficient on the IRA dummy variable is reestablished when lagged Indian population is excluded.
14
   
 
 Columns 3-6 of Table 2 present various models that determine if the number of allotments and acreage 
allotted added decreasing amounts to the overall budget. Columns 3 and 4 suggest the number of allotments did not 
have a diminishing effect on the BIA budget; rather, there is evidence, albeit imprecise, that allotments progressively 
added more to the BIA budget. Columns 5 and 6 suggest that same imprecise relationship with respect to acres 
allotted. Though not shown, two simple regression models of logged BIA funds on logged allotments and on logged 
allotted acres generate small and negative partial effects, however these coefficients are only significant at the 12% 
and 16% levels respectively. Thus, there is no definite empirical evidence that allotment was in the best interest of a 
budget-oriented bureaucracy.   
 
                                                          
12 The number of allotments, allotted acreage, and Indian population are collected from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs. The data on nominal GDP are obtained from the Historical Statistics, Millennium Edition. 
13 Adding a time trend ensures that logged BIA appropriations are (trend) stationary. Using the AIC criteria to determine the lag 
order, an augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) equation of ΔlnY
t 
= α
0 
+ α
1
lnY
t-1 
+ α 
2
T +∑α
i
ΔlnY
t-i 
+  yields a test statistic of -5.646 
with a p-value of 0.000. The ADF test statistics on BIA budgets (in levels) with and without a time trend are -2.967, and -1.053, 
respectively. Both tests suggest that the null hypothesis of α
1
=0 cannot be rejected when BIA appropriations are in levels. 
14 These results are available from the author. The negative and insignificant partial effects are also robust when squaring the 
time trend to allow for a non-linear growth rate and when converting the budget into real terms.  
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 These results are tested for robustness by isolating only the land management portions of the BIA budget. 
Education appropriations, New Deal relief funds, and Court of Claims judgments are thereby excluded from the total 
budget variable and each model in estimated. The land management variable is thus compromised of funds for 
salaries and general expenses, general administration, health, fulfilling treaty stipulations, irrigation, land purchases, 
industrial assistance, and trust accounts. The results are shown in Table 3.  Columns 1 and 2 illustrate the same 
results as the earlier unadjusted regression models. Passage of the IRA reflects a 37% decrease in the growth rate in 
land management appropriations. Columns 3-6 contain the same results as earlier: the first- and second-order terms 
on allotments and acreage allotted are all insignificant. Again,  the most plausible explanation for these results is that 
the decline in the number of acres under BIA jurisdiction -- which would have decreased the demand for BIA land 
management funds -- was offset by the growth in its role in managing heirship problems -- which necessitated 
greater budgetary demands.
15
             
 
 Interacting time dummies with the number of allotments and acres allotted further tests the robustness of 
these results. Using a dummy variable isolating the years after 1920, a Cochrane-Orcutt regression of logged land 
management appropriations on a time trend, logged allotments, an interaction term, lagged logged Indian 
population, and lagged logged nominal GDP yields an elasticity of land management appropriations with respect to 
allotments that is negative and insignificant (-0.063 with a p-value of 0.112) and an interaction term that is positive 
but insignificant (-0.234 with a p-value of 0.345). This provides evidence, albeit imprecise, that the structural break 
in the partial effects of allotment on the BIA budget worked in the opposite direction as claimed by McChesney. The 
same general results hold for acreage allotted: the coefficient on logged acres is negative but insignificant and the 
coefficient on the interaction term is positive and highly insignificant.  
 
 In sum, these results suggest that there is no empirical evidence that the IRA and Dawes Act dramatically 
altered the BIA's budget. Isolating the land management appropriations only collaborates with earlier results. In fact, 
under certain model specifications, there is statistical significant evidence that passing of the IRA decreased the 
growth rate in the BIA budget. Regardless of the model specification, there is also no evidence of a diminishing role 
of allotment on either the total budget or the land management portion of the BIA's budget. One possible hypothesis 
for the lack of statistically significant relationships between the land management policy reforms and the BIA 
budget is that the discretionary components of BIA land management funding were constrained by changes in other 
portions of the BIA budget that were either large but unrelated to land reforms, such as educational appropriations, 
or increases in the budget from sources outside the sponsor's appropriations committees such as New Deal 
emergency funds or Court of Claims judgment appropriations. Unlike the passage of these enactments, 
Congressional appropriations members, especially western congressmen, could "vote" in their constituents’ interests 
by underfunding certain aspects of the BIA budget, particularly the projects that imposed the highest costs on their 
respective special interest groups. Certain components of the land management budget such as the expansion of the 
Indian land base, land used or held by whites, would have done exactly that.  
 
 To determine if funding from other sources crowded out discretionary funds for land management, the land 
management appropriations are tested in a pairwise fashion with three types of BIA funds to determine if they are 
cointegrated. First, New Deal funds were mostly transferred to the BIA through the assistance of the Secretary of the 
Interior Harold Ickes, a pro-Indian reformist who himself once was considered to head the BIA. Second, the Court 
of Claims judgments reflect large increases in the BIA and were appropriated by the decisions from the Court of 
Claims. Typically, claims were against the poor management of the BIA budget. Favorable decisions would have 
possibly decreased the bargaining power of the BIA to further enhance its budget. Third, educational appropriations 
represent a large portion of the budget and grew substantially after 1930 as there was a regime change from boarding 
to day school education. A budget-conscious Congress may have been willing to fund the educational process that 
provides fewer direct costs to their special interests, but these budgetary approvals to Indian education may have 
hinder the total growth in other parts of the BIA budget.  For these results, these variables are chosen to test this 
crowding out hypothesis.  
 
                                                          
15 Though the results are not shown, each model in Table 3 is also calculated in real terms. The Dawes dummy variable does 
become positive but highly insignificant. The IRA variable is negative and insignificant under various model specifications. The 
signs and significance are identical for the allotments and acres variables in Table 3.   
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 In order to use cointegration tests, first the variables need to be non-stationary and integrated of the same 
order. The results from various augmented Dickey Fuller tests are shown in Table 4. All the variables are non-
stationary and integrated of the same order. Second, to determine if any cointegrating relationships hold, I apply 
Johansen's (1991, 1995) maximum likelihood cointegration tests. The results are shown in Table 5. These results 
reveal there is a cointegrating relationship with all the appropriation types. Both test statistics confirm this. Column 
5 of Table 5 shows that higher levels of education, relief, and judgment appropriations are associated with lower 
levels of land funding. This relationship is stronger with education and judgment appropriations.  
 
 The last step to determine the crowding out effect is to infer causality, which is employed using Granger 
(1969) causality tests. This test is employed for each pair of statistically significant cointegrating relationships. As 
shown in Table 6, changes in education and relief funds cause changes to land funding. The causality tests thereby 
suggest that causality flows from relief and education funding to the land-oriented budget. No causality relationship 
can be determined between land management and judgment funding. Regardless, in combination with the results in 
Table 5, this analysis provides some insight in the absence of budgetary enhancements from initiating and then 
stopping allotment. These tests suggest that the growth in the relief and education portions of the BIA budget 
crowded out growth in land management appropriations.      
  
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
  
In sum, this paper concludes that ignoring an upward trending BIA budget yields spurious relationships in 
support of a bureaucratic aggrandizement hypothesis.  The growth in this BIA budget identified by McChesney 
(1990) from changing its private property regimes is simply accidental.  Adopting a time trend and isolating changes 
in the land management portion of the budget produce no evidence, and sometimes contradictory, of budgetary 
growth from the passage of Indian land reforms.  These findings collaborate with anecdotal evidence on the 
expressed intentions of the IRA's original draft and the conflicting nature of allotment on the BIA's budget.  
Furthermore, the limited bureaucratic bargaining power over its discretionary funds concerning land management is 
both gleaned from primary sources and supported with econometric rigor.  
 
If BIA aggrandizement cannot explain the decision to alter federal Indian policy in 1887 and 1934 
respectively, then is there any alternative interest group explanation for regulatory change?   Banner (2005: 335fn62) 
has also challenged the BIA aggrandizement hypothesis by suggesting that "the rise and fall of eastern white 
humanitarian support for allotment better explains events, in my view, than the effects of allotment and its 
subsequent abolition on the BIA's budget." Universal support against allotment by reform groups was actually 
slower than Banner's conjecture.  Even by 1930, there was still a surprising modicum of support for allotment by 
Christian organizations like the prominent Indian Rights Association who was hardly supportive of Collier's original 
bill (Blend, 1983). For example, in their 1934 Annual Report, support for the passage of IRA was subdued: "Many 
features of the Act are good; it is much better than the original bill but it contains some doubtful features that 
certainly will need revision" (Annual Report, 1934: 12).  Daily (2004: 80-99) also documents the continued support 
of allotment by various influential humanitarian interests such as the Home Mission Council of the Federal Council 
of Churches, the Christian Reformed Church, and certain members of the Board of Indian Commissioners during the 
Wheeler-Howard Act Congressional hearings in 1934.  
 
The development of a unified theory of Indian policy will most likely rule out any private interest 
approach.  Otis (1973) aptly surveyed the historical literature on Indian allotment to rule out any rent-seeking 
behavior by western settlers, ranchers and railroads in the development the BIA's land policy.  Most historians 
believe that allotment was a mistake, remedied with the passage of the IRA.  This simple explanation may have 
some merit.  The privatization of land was coupled with the disbandment of tribal governments, a public good on all 
reservations.  Years of costly and ineffective BIA land management may reflect an unfortunate but necessary cost of 
having a paternalistic sovereign finance tribal governments.  As mentioned above, if the federal government was 
unwilling to appropriate funding for tribal-led land management practices, then the costs of the federal trust 
relationship needs to be compared to the benefit of establishing federally-recognized tribal governments.  This 
conjecture suggests that a second-best theory of ending the privatization of reservations may be surprisingly 
germane to the American Indian experience.  
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Figure 1:  Indian Bureau Regular, Tribal and Special Funds, 1877-1945 
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Source: The State of the Finances of the US for the fiscal years 1877-1892, and the Combined Statement of Balances, 
Appropriations, and Expenditures for the fiscal years 1893-1945.  The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
1877-1914, 1920-1940. 
 
 
Table 1:  Indian Reorganization Act Appropriations, 1935-1940 
(Fraction of Total Annual Authorization in Parentheses) 
Variable 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
Organizing Indian Corporations 
 
 
$150 
(0.60) 
$0 
(0.00) 
$0 
(0.64) 
 
$130 
(0.52) 
 
$80 
(0.32) 
$80 
(0.32) 
       
Acquisition of Indian Lands 
 
$1,000 
(0.50) 
$0 
(0.00) 
$1,000 
(0.50) 
$950 
(0.48) 
$500 
(0.25) 
$650 
(0.33) 
       
Revolving Fund 
 
$2,500 
(0.25) 
$0 
(0.00) 
$980 
(0.10) 
$520 
(0.05) 
$400 
(0.04) 
$400 
(0.04) 
       
Educational Funds 
 
$0 
(0.00) 
$175 
(0.70) 
$0 
(0.00) 
$50 
(0.20) 
$100 
(0.40) 
$135 
(0.54) 
       
Total IRA Funding 
 
$3,650 
(0.29) 
$175 
(0.01) 
$2,140 
(0.17) 
$1,650 
(0.13) 
$1,080 
(0.09) 
$1,265 
(0.10) 
Notes: The appropriations are expressed in thousands ($000s). For "organizing Indian corporations" and "for loans to Indians for 
vocational and trade schools," the BIA was authorized to spend $250,000 annually on each program. For the "acquisition of 
Indian lands," the IRA authorized $2 million annually. For "loans to tribal corporations for economic development," Congress 
authorized an appropriation of $10 million. 
 
Source: Combined Statement of Balances, Appropriations, and Expenditures, 1935-1940. 
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Table 2:  GLS Estimates of the Bureaucratic Aggrandizment Hypothesis 
(t-Statistics in Parenthesis) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
trend 0.0394*** 0.0219* 681595.0*** 523090.5*** 692224.4*** 502860.0*** 
 (9.34) (1.80) (9.67) (3.72) (9.66) (3.50) 
       
Dawes (year=1888) -0.205 -0.157     
 (-1.13) (-0.58)     
       
IRA (year=1935) -0.356** -0.055     
 (-2.01) (-0.28)     
       
ln(Pop) t-1  -0.472     
  (-0.06)     
       
ln(GDP) t-1  0.387     
  (1.47)     
       
Allotments t   -856.2 -956.7   
   (-0.89) (-0.90)   
       
Sq. Allotments t   0.0507 0.0593   
   (0.56) (0.62)   
       
Acres t     -2.169 -3.437 
     (-0.50) (-0.78) 
       
Sq. Acres t     0.000000934 0.00000141 
     (0.48) (0.70) 
       
Pop t-1    21.39  23.94 
    (0.49)  (0.54) 
       
GDPt-1    126.17  141.63 
    (1.36)  (1.49) 
N 68 63 68 63 68 63 
Adj R2 0.712 0.789 0.598 0.739 0.580 0.731 
F 56.09*** 42.70*** 34.17*** 36.14*** 31.79*** 34.65*** 
DW Stat 1.92 1.94 2.12 1.99 2.14 2.00 
Notes:  * Denotes significance at the 0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
Standard errors are corrected for first-order serial correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. The coefficient and standard 
errors of the constant term are omitted from this table. 
 
Source: See text. 
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Table 3:GLS Estimates of Land Management Appropriations 
(t-Statistics in Parenthesis) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
trend 0.039*** 0.0226* 657888.2*** 517796.5*** 668052.5*** 4999647.5*** 
 (9.36) (1.90) (9.01) (3.82) (8.90) (3.60) 
       
Dawes (year=1888) -0.228 -0.191     
 (-1.26) (-0.72)     
       
IRA (year=1935) -0.379** -0.077     
 (2.14) (-0.40)     
       
ln(Pop) t-1  -0.055     
  (-0.07)     
       
ln(GDP) t-1  0.381     
  (1.34)     
       
Allotments t   -753.79 -980.24   
   (-0.84) (-0.98)   
       
Sq. Allotments t   0.039 0.049   
   (-0.48) (-0.57)   
       
Acres t     -1.984 -3.253 
     (-0.50) (-0.80) 
       
Sq. Acres t     0.0000001 0.0000001 
     (0.57) (0.72) 
       
Pop t-1    28.02  30.672 
    (0.68)  (0.73) 
       
GDPt-1    113.42  127.34 
    (1.28)  (1.40) 
       
N 68 63 68 63 68 63 
Adj R2 0.712 0.774 0.562 0.743 0.537 0.733 
F 54.01*** 43.49*** 29.59*** 36.89*** 26.97*** 34.97*** 
DW Stat 1.90 1.93 2.18 2.01 2.19 2.02 
Notes:  * Denotes significance at the 0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and *** at the 0.01 level. 
Standard errors are corrected for first-order serial correlation using the Cochrane-Orcutt producer. The coefficient and standard 
errors of the constant term are omitted from this table. 
 
Source: See text. 
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Table 4:  Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results 
(p-Values in Parentheses) 
Variable Lag Order H0: Not Stationary in 
Levels 
H0: Not Trend 
Stationary 
H0: Not Difference 
Stationary 
Education 4 -0.284 
(0.927) 
-1.927 
(0.641) 
-4.452*** 
(0.002) 
     
Emergency Relief 3 -2.405 
(0.140) 
-2.787 
(0.202) 
-4.540*** 
(0.002) 
     
Land 3 -0.928 
(0.778) 
-2.387 
(0.386) 
-4.538*** 
(0.001) 
     
Judgments 3 1.481 
(0.997) 
-0.289 
(0.989) 
-3.259** 
(0.016) 
Notes:  The lag order was determined using the AIC criteria. ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level, ***denotes significance at 
the 0.01 level.  
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Table 5:  Johansen Cointegration Test Results and Cointegrating Relationships 
Variable Lag Order Hypothesis Trace Statistic Max.  
Statistic 
Cointegrating 
Coefficient 
(Standardized) 
Education/Land 1 H0: r=0 H1: r=1 20.859*** 19.349*** -1.719*** 
(0.272) 
 
      
Emergency 
Relief/Land 
2 H0: r=0 H1: r=1 18.084** 12.295** -2.607*** 
(0.624) 
 
      
Judgments/Land 1 H0: r=0 H1: r=1 32.489*** 31.948*** -2.586*** 
(0.251) 
 
Notes: The lag order was determined using the AIC criteria. This statistic was minimized at a lag length of 4 for each variable. 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.  
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
Table 6:  Granter Causality Test Results 
Null Hypothesis Lag Length F-statistic 
Education Appropriations do not cause Land 
Appropriations 
2 4.27** 
Land Appropriations do not cause Education 
Appropriations 
2 0.01 
Emergency Relief funding does not cause 
Land Appropriations 
2 2.61* 
Land Appropriations do not cause 
Emergency Relief funding 
2 0.83 
Judgment Funds do not cause Land Funding 2 9.84*** 
Land Funding does not cause Judgment 
Funds 
2 2.54* 
Notes:  The lag order was determined using the AIC criteria. This statistic was minimized at a lag length of 4 for each variable. * 
denotes significance at the 0.10 level, ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.  
 
Source: See text. 
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NOTES 
